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GOVERNING THE CANADIAN STATE: THE CONSTITUTION
IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, NEO-LIBERALISM,
POPULISM, DECENTRALIZATION AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Harry W. Arthurs
INTRODUCTION: A DONKEY'S
PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION
Viewer discretion is advised. I am going to offer
you a perspective on the constitution which is stranger
even than the Trudeau vision which twenty years ago
sparked his epic battles with Merv Leitch and Peter
Lougheed over the National Energy Policy, the
Charter,' and repatriation of the Constitution. And
worse yet, though I worry about the Constitution, I do
not know much about it; I do not often write about it,
and as I will demonstrate in a moment, I am not even
sure what it is. I did, however, read something recently
in a book on modern European history which seemed to
capture my own sentiments almost exactly - an
observation attributed to a peasant in Salonika. then
under Turkish rule, in 1908: "Constitution is such a
wonderful thing," said this peasant, "that he who does
not know what it is, is a donkey."'2 I identify with the
donkey, not the peasant.
This puts me at a serious disadvantage in today's
world. Scores of post-colonial and post-communist
societies are attempting to turn the page of history by
drafting new and more perfect fundamental laws.
Established democracies are attempting to solve their
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [(Charter].
M. Mazower The Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth (Century
(New York: Vintage Books, 2000) at 6. Mazower does not cite
his source.
My identity arguably puts me on the side of the angels. As
recounted in Numbers 22 21 el seq, a donkey was three times
beaten by his master, the prophet Balaam, for refusing to carry
him on a mission on behalf of the princes of M oab to curse the
children of Israel. In fact, the donkey had balked in order to
save Balaam from the wrath of an armed angel invisible to
Balaam, but visible to the donkey who had been dispatched
to forestall the Moabite persecution. I am grateful to Tsvi
Kahana for drawing this sometimes overlooked biblical episode
to my attention, thereby diminishing my embarrassment at
labelling myself a donkey.
complex political, social and economic problems by
reinterpreting or rewriting their constitutions. And here
in Canada, especially in academic circles and in the
appellate courts, constitutional concerns and Charter
chatter dominate the agenda though, I suspect,
Canadian peasants do not show quite the same
enthusiasm for constitutions as did that rustic sage of
Salonika. So here I am. playing donkey: what exactly is
a constitution?
I start with a simple notion. Constitutions
constitute. They define or redefine states, sub-state
entities, their institutions, and the relationship amongst
all of the above. They set out the rights and duties of
citizens and articulate the values, aspirations and
understandings by which ethnic, class, gender, cultural,
regional, religious, linguistic and othergroups associate
within the state. They prescribe a framework within
which state law, administration and policies must be
conducted. Finally, constitutions are iconic symbols of
continuity or discontinuity with the past, of legitimacy
for the present, of promise for the future. Constitutions
constitute.
However there is a difficulty. Constitutions - at
least in the lawyer's sense of the term - constitute less
in practice than in theory. Some states with written
constitutions utterly transform themselves over time
with few, if any, formal constitutional amendments and
sometimes even without recourse to judicial review.
Others adopt one constitutional amendment after
another and nothing changes. Similarly, while some
states without written constitutions adapt easily to
changing ideas of whatis fundamental, indispensable or
appropriate in theirj uridical and political arrangements,
others do not.
So constitutions count for something: but not that
much. True, states do need a foundation of fundamental
norms. But such a foundation does not have to be the
formal, juridical "constitution." It may consist of many
other things: the deep structures and conventions of
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political life; long-standing compacts amongst
"founding peoples," religious communities or
geographic regions; the conventional wisdom and
habitual practices of mandarin classes, judges,
corporate elites and knowledge communities; the
tutelary influence of imperial or transnational
institutions; or some vague sense amongst citizens of
shared experience, interests and values. In practical
terms, any of these- or the end of any of these- can
reinforce, modify or displace the practical, the juridical,
even the symbolic, functions of a "constitution." These
are odd ideas about a constitution: I will acknowledge
that. However, since donkeys are not only stupid but
stubborn, I am going to stick with them.
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
POLITICS
As indicated in the title of this paper. I believe that
our Constitution in the expanded sense that I have
just described - is being reshaped by five powerful
forces: neo-liberalism, globalization, populism,
decentralization and judicial activism. Our institutions
are changing: our values are changing; the way we talk
and think about things is changing. Moreover, the
changes I describe are not just part of the normal
evolution of institutions, values and political discourse
that takes place in any healthy society. They are
constitutional in character. Whether that is our intention
or not, we are making it much more difficult to reverse
present tendencies, to return to old values, institutions
and discourses, or to adopt new ones at some point in
the future. Our new constitution, I maintain, is being
chiselled in stone.Now many people will argue that this
is a good thing. that this is exactly what constitutions
are supposed to do, and that Canada is facing such
serious challenges that it has to reinvent itself. I agree;
we do face serious challenges; we have to reinvent
ourselves.
Here is one list of what many Canadians would
identify as our greatest challenges: How can we free up
the energy and imagination of Canadians so that we can
regain our status as one of the world's most productive
and affluent nations? How can we ensure that our
economy is not strangled by government regulation,
that our entrepreneurs and brightest minds are not
driven abroad by excessive taxation, that our young
people do not succumb to habits of dependency and self
indulgence? How can we ensure that power is exercised
by governments which are close to the people, rather
than by remote bureaucrats in Ottawa? How can we
make all public institutions more accountable, more
responsive to the opinions and desires of ordinary
Canadians? How can we protect the social values and
cultural traditions which built this country and which
remain our best guide for the future?
That is one version of a list, but there are lots of
versions. My own is somewhat different: How can we
exercise our sovereignty and preserve our identity in the
shadow of the American colossus? How can we
succeed in a globalized world without control over key
sectors of our own domestic economy, and with our
relatively small pool of human and financial capital?
How can we accommodate the aspirations of Quebec,
of aboriginal nations and of assertive provinces, regions
and metropolitan areas within a federation in which the
central government is already precluded from
addressing key issues which no one else can resolve?
How can we interest our citizens in electoral politics
and other forms of civic engagement? How can we pay
for the public services and infrastructure that we want
and need? And what will be left of the Canada we once
knew the state which built our economic
infrastructure, which breathed life into our cultural
institutions, which provided economic security and
social services to Canadians what will be left of that
Canada once we have finished stripping the state of
resources, of legitimacy and of any hope or means of
recovering these?
Now to ask an obvious question. If our visions of
the challenges facing Canada are so very different, how
can we as a nation get on and do something about
them? I have a short and simple-minded answer to that
question: we try to elect the political party which comes
closest to our sense of where the country needs to go.
Of course we can not realistically expect that any
government will follow through completely: it wants to
stay in power. so it must build some bridges to people
who opposed it; it will never have enough resources, so
it needs to set priorities and arrange compromises
amongst its supporters: it may develop new analyses or
confront new circumstances and have to change its
policies; it may be unable to deal quickly with some
problems because they are structural or others because
they are totally beyond its powers. And we have to
accept that being composed of fallible people
some governments will simply disappoint us. If they
do, however, at some point discontents will accumulate,
new ideas and personalities will emerge. public opinion
will shift, and a new government will be elected.
This rather boring, highly imperfect- some
would say terminally ineffectual process answers to
the name of parliamentary democracy. Some people
who are frustrated by it - and I am not one of them -
favour radical solutions, all of them arguably
democratic though not necessarily parliamentary. These
solutions come down to an attempt to permanently
change the rules of Canadian politics. Its advocates
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hope that by some process - constitutional
amendment, judicial intervention, restructuring of the
social and economic fabric of the nation, privileging
certain communities or values over others it will be
made impossible for people who hold opposing views
to ever gain power, or if they do, to implement those
views. This strategy of seeking to permanently change
the rules of politics and fix forever the future course of




The constitutionalization of politics enjoys
considerable support on the left, from the so-called
Court Party of equality-seeking groups. from
progressive lawyers and law professors and from social
democrats who only ten years ago promoted a Social
Charter as part of the Charlottetown Accord. But these
groups are pretty marginal today. Most of the people
who want to make their ideas permanent, who want to
forever preempt alternative visions, are neo-liberals.
They have one primary goal: they want to drive a stake
through the heart of the activist state: to
"constitutionalize" neo-liberalism; to entrench low
taxes, smaller government, unregulated markets and
free trade with the United States: and to reallocate
powers amongst the various branches and levels of
government in such a way as to forever foreclose
egalitarian, social democratic, centralizing, nationalist
or other deviations. To reiterate an earlier point: little of
this requires amendment to our Constitution Act; yet
the intended result is meant to be chiselled in juridical
stone. I will explain quickly, beginning with taxes, from
which much else follows.
Canadians aspire to maintain social services,
support our national cultures, and avoid American-style
extremes of economic inequality all of which cost
money. However, Canadians have also been persuaded
that they are overtaxed, and that our economy will
suffer so long as we have higher corporate and personal
tax rates than the United States. As a result, many
provinces have adopted legislation forbidding
governments to raise taxes or run deficits. In Ontario,
my own province, new legislation provides that taxes
cannot be increased, and new taxes cannot be
introduced, without a referendum: if the government
budgets for a deficit, cabinet members automatically
forfeit a portion of their annual salary.' While perhaps
not, in a formal sense, "constitutional," this legislation
is for practical purposes unrepealable. This ensures that
4 Taxpayer Protection Act. 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 7, Sched. A;
Balanced Budget Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 7, Sched. B.
all decisions hereafter are zero-sum decisions. If the
government needs to spend money, for example, to
prevent another tragedy such as occurred in the small
town of Walkerton, Ontario where seven people died
from drinking contaminated water and over 2000
became ill 5  _ it must cut something else, say
workplace safety inspections; if it wants to spend more
on the homeless, it must cut culture or education.
Worse yet, future Ontario governments with different
views about public spending will be effectively denied
the chance to reintroduce Keynesian policies of
counter-cyclical public expenditure to stimulate the
economy, to redistribute wealth through progressive
taxation, to maintain or increase state-provided
services, or to rebuild a public service with the energy
and talent to conceive, design and administer welfare
and regulatory strategies.
I want to stress that this is not a complaint about
the factthattoday's government happens to believe that
the wisest policy is to lower taxes and deregulate the
economy while yesterday's or tomorrow's government
might prefer to increase state activities and
expenditures and therefore to raise taxes. Such
divergences are inevitable; they are of the essence in a
democracy. My complaint is about the attempt by
politicians of one persuasion to make it legally and
practically impossible to make it constitutionally
impossible - for politicians of another persuasion to




Second, I want to point out that increasingly in
today's globalized world, our constitution is being
revised as much by international treaties and
relationships as it is by domestic law and politics. Both
the WTO andNAFTA constrain Canadian governments
from embarking on various forms of activism say
regulation of consumer markets, the environment,
competition or cultural industries. Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, for example, allows foreign corporations to
seek compensation from a private arbitrator if they are
adversely affected by regulatory legislation enacted by
a Canadian government. Several U.S. corporations have
already received compensation - including lost future
profits for environmental and health regulations
imposed by Canada and not only have they succeeded
in specific cases, they have intimidated Canadian
governments into settling several claims prior to
See Ontario, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry The Events of
May 2000 and Related Issue (Toronto: Queen's Printer for
Ontario, 2002).
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arbitration, and into abandoning controversial
legislative projects. To restate the issue in formal,
constitutional terms, NAFTA has introduced into
Canadian jurisprudence a more virulent form of the
American "takings" doctrine than prevails in its country
of origin - though it benefits only foreign firms, not
Canadian firms.
Other international developments also affect the
legislative competence of Canada's Parliament. Our
commitment to harmonize our intellectual property
laws with those of our trading partners, especially the
United States, forced us to repeal legislation which
allowed us to produce cheap generic drugs. We may
find ourselves unable to prevent the export of water or
electrical power or the import of foreign cultural
products and banking services because that would
constitute discrimination against foreign firms. Our
public health scheme might even be struck down as an
illicit export subsidy or if selected services are
privatized - opened up more generally to foreign
competition. Nor is the constitutional effect of
globalization restricted to treaties like NAFTA . I want
to briefly mention three other developments which have
underscored the extent to which globalization - and
continental economic integration - have altered our
"real," if not our juridical, constitution.
The first is the process of what I call "globalization
of the mind." "Right thinking people" in Canada and
around the world, especially members of influential
policy elites such as politicians, civil servants,
academics and media people, have come to accept the
premises of neo-liberalism as axiomatic, as needing no
justification or explanation. The ideas that governments
should be smaller, taxes lower, markets freer and states
more open to trade and investment may not be quite as
deeply ingrained amongst Canadian elites as amongst
Americans. But it is a long time since these beliefs were
challenged by anyone in public life who hoped to be
taken seriously. They have become as much a part of
our unwritten constitution as, say, the former belief that
we have an obligation to share a little of our wealth
with our fellow citizens so we can all enjoy reasonably
equitable access to public goods and services.
Second, these beliefs became the guiding
principles of our public policy not simply because they
were espoused by influential and powerful Canadians,
but because they were also held by bond dealers,
currency traders and major investors in London, New
York and Tokyo. If these people deem our welfare state
too generous or our regulatory policies too aggressive,
our dollar may decline even further, our stock markets
may be trashed, our economy vandalized, our tax
revenues diminished and our prosperity laid waste. I
said these things "may" happen; but they may not. It
doesn't really matter. What does matter is that
governments are sensibly reluctant to find out. The
stakes are just too high. So we now have a new
analytic. a new set of values, a new constituency of
interest- the global economy - with power to trump
almost every other consideration in public policy
debates. Whether we are talking about industrial policy.
tax levels, public infrastructure or culture, we cannot
ignore the reaction, or anticipated reaction, of global
markets. In effect, globalization has made market-
friendly policies a first principle of our constitution,
which politicians violate at their peril.
And third, we have experienced a "hollowing out"
of corporate Canada. Not only are many sectors of our
economy dominated by foreign-owned multinationals;
those same multinationals have been increasingly
depriving their Canadian subsidiaries of autonomy, and
transferring many of their key functions from regional
head offices in Toronto or Calgary to global head
offices in New York or Chicago. Nor are Canadian-
owned firms immune from this trend. As more and
more of them are bought up by foreign-based
corporations. their local executive cadres are
dismantled or reduced in authority. As a result, leading
elements of the Canadian business community are
disappearing or shrinking, thus endangering key groups
connected to them on the food chain law firms,
consulting firms, advertising agencies, real estate
companies, software designers, and all the people from
whom they in turn buy goods and services or whom
they support with their tax dollars and charitable
contributions - like universities for example.
How does this affect our Constitution? Canada
depends on a strong civil society. on strong business
leadership, strong financial institutions, strong
knowledge-based industries, strong professions, strong
urban centres, strong charities and universities
supported by private donations as well as public funds
- all of which are put at risk by this process of
hollowing out. In this way, the real constitution, the
operational constitution, adapts to the changing reality
brought on by globalization and continental integration.
My point is not to deny the inevitability- let me
say even the great benefit of Canadajoining NAFTA
or the WTO or of importing American capital, ideas
and ideologies. I simply want to point out that these
developments have brought about a root-and-branch
transformation of Canada's political economy. That
transformation which has been going on for a long
time - intensified from about 1980 to 1990, the very
period when we were repatriating the Constitution,
adopting the Charter and attempting to rewrite the
terms of our federation at Meech Lake and
Charlottetown. Like the changes in our formal
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Constitution, the transformation accomplished by
globalization involved legal changes- repeal of the
old legal regimes which had regulated international
trade and capital flows, and their replacement by new,
liberalized arrangements. However, the new legal
framework of the global economy was hammered out
in international forums where governments more
powerful than our own set the agenda and shaped the
outcomes. Thus, although globalization changed our
Constitution even more profoundly than anything we
did to the Constitution Act, 1982. there were no
federal provincial negotiations, no public consultations.
no referenda, no Supreme Court references. Once we
decided to accede to the new global legal order, all that
remained was for parliament to pass laws implementing
these treaties and to repeal legislation which did not
conform to them. But make no mistake: the
transformations wrought by globalization were
pervasive and seemingly permanent. They were in a
profound sense "constitutional."
CONSTITUTIONALIZING POPULISM
Canada has been experiencing a change in the
discourse and deep structures of its political system.
Populist movements mostly of the right but
occasionally of the left have mobilized support for
direct democracy which, they believe, would translate
"the will of the people" promptly and without distortion
into binding public policy. Consequently. they have
disparaged representative governments, denied the
legitimacy of both the courts and the executive,
denigrated the views of professionals and public
intellectuals, devalued the concept of public service,
made the term "politician" a pejorative and in all these
ways, removed activist government from our lexicon of
plausible political choices. Ontario, for example,
enacted its "Fewer Politicians Act" to great acclaim
although, when combined with other legislation, its
effect was first to shift power from local governments
to the province, then to dilute access by citizens to their
now-fewer provincial and municipal representatives,
and finally to inscribe in legislative language the notion
that reducing the number of "politicians" was
comparable to the reducing the population of pests or
predators. ' Simultaneously, Ontario dismantled public
consultative bodies which were thought to be
dominated by "special interests" such as women, labour
and visible minorities and closed down "ivory-tower"
agencies such as the Law Reform Commission. Finally.
populists in and out of government right across the
country favour referenda and recall elections to keep
elected representatives on a short leash; they favour
electoral laws which ensure a greater role for single-
issue organizations in the political process; they favour
constitutional am endments which permanently privilege
rural voters and discount the power of metropolitan
voters. In all this. populists have been aided and abetted
- not to say incited - by powerful financial interests,
rapidly consolidating media empires, and influential
local elites, as well as by people of principle who are
genuinely concerned about the alienation of ordinary
citizens from the theory and practice of parliamentary
government.
Ironically. populist mistrust of governments has
been acknowledged and legitimized by both the courts
and the legislature. Judicial decisions have overturned
government action, held governments liable in damages
for neglect or wrongdoing in the discharge of their
functions, and imposed new procedural requirements on
government agencies. And legislators at both the
provincial and federal levels have proffered hostages to
fortune in the form of new laws, policies and practices
designed to create the appearance, if not the reality, of
greater government accountability, transparency and
responsiveness.
In short, we are gradually internalizing and
institutionalizing, and thus constitutionalizing, populist
attitudes and values. This may be a good thing or a bad
one. But it is clear that the success of populism will
reduce the influence of sophisticated ideas and expert
analysis on policy formation, will undermine the
parliamentary party system which advocates and
propagates activist public policies, will deflate the
willingness and capacity of ministers and members to
rally support for such policies, and will diminish
respect for the public service whose professionalism
once earned it considerable trust. In other words,
though perhaps an unintended consequence, to the
extent that populism succeeds, it will construct
constitutional barriers to the activist state.
All of this may be sweet music to people who
believe that activist government deserves its fate, that
it has left us legacies of debt and dependency which did
considerable harm to Canada and Canadians. Maybe so,
maybe not. My concern is that sometime in the future
we may want more from the state than we think we
want now. But we will not be able to get more. If
populism becomes the way we think about government
and politics, if populist ideas are entrenched in laws and
institutions, if populist values are constitutionalized, we
would not have the kind of state that can deliver what
may someday be expected of it.
Representation Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 28.
(2003) 13:1 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM
CONSTITUTIONALIZING A WEAK
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Fourth, there are strong decentralizing tendencies
at work in the Canadian federation. A visitor from Mars
or Moscow or east-end Montreal might think that the
Constitution Acts give ultimate power to the federal
government, but in practice things have turned out quite
differently. The federal government's residual power
over peace order and good government, like its
jurisdiction over foreign affairs, trade, commerce and
interprovincial undertakings. was emasculated early on
by the conservative judges of the Privy Council. As a
result, the federal government was unable to protect
workers' rights, consumer interests or the environment.
During the two world wars, and for some time after
1945, the federal government was able to use its powers
to tax and spend in order to entice or coerce the
provinces into cooperating in national social welfare
schemes, public enterprises and regulatory programs.
However, over the past twenty years, federal power has
again shrivelled. Fear of secession has made the federal
government wary of challenging Quebec's expansive
use of its powers in the areas of education, immigration
and foreign relations; other provincial governments
refuse to collaborate in national strategies - such as
implementation of the Kyoto Accord - which they
deem to be hostile to their own interests: regionally-
based populist parties ridicule Ottawa as remote and
unresponsive; and the populist tax revolt has forced the
federal government to reduce or abandon the shared
cost programs which gave it the financial leverage with
which to shape national social policies and economic
strategies.
But the federal government is the only government
that could conceivably stand up for Canada's interests
as the nations of the world negotiate the rules of the
global economy. It alone has any prospect of regulating
transnational corporations and capital flows. It alone
might be able to orchestrate the development of
Canada's human, natural and capital resources to create
the strongest possible economy. And it alone could
animate social or cultural policies which would bind
Canadians together. However, the federal government
lacks the legal power, political will or financial clout to
really do any of these things. As a consequence of this
power vacuum at the centre of our federation, there is
essentially no Canadian government today which can
manage the issues thrown up by neo-liberalism and free
trade, much less take us in a different direction if we
decide that is where we want to go. In this sense
decentralization is helping to cast in stone to
constitutionalize - a number of neo-liberal policies




Fifth, a word about the juridification of our public
life. From the inception of our federation, courts
refereed disputes between the national and provincial
governments, often favouring the provinces. From at
least the 1920s and 1930s. right down to the 1970s, our
judiciary was active perhaps hyper-active in
reviewing administrative action, generally favouring
individuals and corporations, rather than the state,
unions or the environment. To say the least, these
decisions were not regarded as brilliant by most
academic experts and many political observers. But this
judicial activism did not matter too much: determined
governments found ways around court rulings, and
generally got on with their programs. In 1982. however,
we adopted a constitutional Charter of Rights and
Freedoms which had several important effects.
First, it tempted marginalised groups such as
women, aboriginal peoples and the disabled to seek
magical, rights-based solutions, and thereby diverted
their scarce resources and energies into litigation
strategies and out of direct social action and progressive
coalition politics. Alas, they gained little as a result.
Judges, it turns out, cannot reconstruct cultures,
reallocate public resources or pry the hands of rich
people off the levers of power. Second, the Charter to
some extent diverted public expenditure from social
programs to legal services, institutions and processes,
and prompted a shift from informal to adversarial
procedures in many contexts. This has been a boon for
lawyers, but costly for public bureaucracies, civil
society actors and relationships between them. And
third, the Charter has converted corporations into
empowered citizens, who can finance endless litigation
thus enabling them to dominate the electoral process,
poison people with tobacco and frustrate whatever
regulatory impulses still survive in government. This
new juridified paradigm of social relations and politics
in Canada has also weakened the activist state and
strengthened neo-liberalism.
To sum up, but not quite to conclude: Canada's
constitution is changing quite dramatically. However,
except for the Charter, it has not been formally
amended. The changes have resulted primarily from
treaties, legislation. and judicial interventions, and
especially from the restructuring of our economy, and
the reconfiguration of our political discourse, processes
and culture. Under this latest version of our
constitution, the Canadian state is no longer active but
passive, no longer powerful but weak, no longer
centralized but devolved, no longer responsive to
domestic policy preferences but to global market forces
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and ideologies, no longer governed by parliamentary
politics and the civil service but increasingly by
populist impulses and legal proceedings. These new
attributes of the Canadian state are said to be essential
for our national interest and uniquely congenial to our
national character. That is why they are
"constitutional": they have become normative bedrock:
they are long-lasting, they find their way into
legislation and judicial interpretations; they become
embedded in invented traditions and imagined
conventions: they fundamentally shape the way we
think about things as lawyers and citizens: and they are
as difficult to change as any provision of the
Constitution Act' itself.
Whether as a cause or a consequence of
juridification, lawyers and judges are starting to talk
differently about the constitution than they used to. In
particular, we are hearing a lot these days about the
"unwritten constitution." Counsel have argued. and
judges have agreed in cases like the Patriation
Reference' and the Secession Reference, ' that "the
unwritten constitution" allows courts to make
authoritative but not legally binding
pronouncements about highly controversial political
issues. The Supreme Court addressed these issues not,
for the most part, by applying the law of the
constitution, but by "finding" long-lost constitutional
practices or conventions, rewriting Canadian and
British history, proclaiming a consensus about the rule
of law, democracy and pluralism, piggy-backing on
international law and custom, and responding to the felt
necessities of our time. Likewise, in interpreting the
written constitution, the Court in cases like Egan" and
Vriend 1 used some unusual techniques notably,
extending Charter protection to groups "analogous" to
those named - to make a different kind of political
decision. I applaud the outcome of all these cases. But
I disagree strongly with the Court's methodology
because it opens the door to more juridification, more
frequent and sweeping challenges to parliamentary
politics, and more intrusive review by judges of
executive action on the basis of ideology disguised as
history, self-evident truth or fundamental principle.
Is it possible to mount a legal challenge to
juridification on the grounds that courts are exceeding
their mandate and making political decisions for which
they have no special competence or authority? Such a
challenge is unlikely to be successful. Courts have a
7 (onswiulion Act. 1982, ss. 38 49, being Schedule B to the
(anadaAcl 1982 (U.K.), c. 11.
Re ference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] I
S.C.R. 753.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
way of pulling themselves up by their jurisdictional
bootstraps Ask a judge, for example, where courts get
the power to issue labour injunctions or to review the
decisions of administrative tribunals. "Simple." the
judge will say: "we have inherent jurisdiction." This is
something of a conversation stopper since there is no
way to challenge that statement, except by appealing to
another judge who will tell you the same thing. This
does make things a bit awkward sometimes, as when
courts tell us that the exercise of inherent jurisdiction
can neither be precluded by Parliament nor held to
Charter standards.' But let that pass. Let pass too the
somewhat unseemly spectacle of judges claiming that
as the human embodiment of "the rule of law" they
have the right to prescribe the procedures for setting
their own salaries' or on their own motion to
hold in contempt people lawfully picketing their
courthouse. The point I want to make is that concepts
such as "inherent jurisdiction" or "unwritten
constitution" hint that like myself, judges may be to
some extent and with great respect - constitutional
donkeys. They too are not quite certain what the
constitution is, and they too conceal their uncertainty in
vague, emotive language which enables them to reach
political conclusions.
However, I do not want to be too hard on judges.
After all, some clever lawyer made them do it. But I do
want to be a bit hard, just for a moment, on the
cleverest, the most loveable, lawyers of them all -
those who teach in law schools. They too we too
are guilty of some serious heresies which have helped
to shape Canada's new constitution. Until fairly
recently, they - we - accepted that law was made by
the legislature, interpreted by the courts and enforced
by the executive. Lately, however, we have been
revising our map of the legal system. My own heresy is
called "legal pluralism," a socio-legal theory which
holds that the state has no monopoly on law-making.
that law emerges from all social and economic contexts
- from universities, workplaces, families and business
networks. Another, somewhat similar heresy, is
embraced by law professors who advocate a new
constitutional status for first nations and a recognition
of their traditional rights and legal processes. A third,
with quite different roots, is the law and economics
movement, which argues that markets generate their
own legal and political logic. These are quite different
theories, but they have this in common: all of them
envisage systems of law which do not originate in or
12 Crevier v. Quebec (A. G.), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220.
13 R.W.D.S.. v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
14 Reference re Remun eration of Judges of the Provincial Cou rt,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
15 British (Columbia Government Employees' Union v. British
Colu inbia, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214.
(2003) 13:1 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM
derive from the Canadian state. In that sense, they are
all pretty radical constitutional heresies.
Of course, you might say that law without the state
is a typical academic flight of fancy, and does not
deserve further consideration. Would that it were so.
But life these days has an odd way of imitating art, and
we are in fact making great strides in detaching law
from the state Today there are more private police in
Canada than public police; prisons are being privatized;
voluntary corporate codes of conduct are replacing
statutes: public enforcement of environmental and
labour standards is giving way to self-regulation or
being contracted out to the private sector; arbitration
and other forms of private dispute resolution account
for a growing share of litigious business. In other
words, legislation, public security, law enforcement and
the administration of justice - the original and, as we
once imagined, the core functions of the state are no
longer constitutionally sacrosanct.
All of this, I want to say, has potentially huge
implications for a lawyer's understanding of the
constitution. What is law, and what is the rule of law,
now that the state no longer claims a monopoly over
making, administering and enforcing it? On what
grounds might a court claim jurisdiction over, say,
discipline in a private prison? What liability does
government have for the acts or omissions of private
agents which have assumed its previous functions? Our
legal vocabulary, I think, is starting to adjust to this
new constitutional reality. For example, we seem to be
using the word "governance" more and more, and the
word "government" less and less. "Government," we
might say, is the process by which states exercise the
power they are given by their constitutions. By contrast
'governance" is a more generic process which
encompasses the ways in which private as well as
public organizations direct their affairs: hence
"university governance" or "corporate governance" or
"governance of the global economy." We use the word
governance in order to focus on how things get done,
with no special importance being attached to who or
what is doing them. Like conceptions of law without
the state, "governance" conjures up a new
constitutional order in which the state is no longer
regarded as the ultimate source of power and legitimacy
in our society, in which government is no longer the
indispensable instrument of our collective ambitions
and the guarantor of social justice. In such a
constitutional order, it follows that government is
merely one supplier amongst many of public goods and
public services, and that its performance must be
judged by the same bottom line standards as competing
providers such as corporations or markets.
This new constitutional order has not escaped the
notice of lawyers who are suing governments more
often and more successfully for acts or omissions that
were once considered acts of state or political questions
beyond the purview of the courts. Such litigation, in
turn, changes public perceptions and expectations of the
state, and reinforces underlying disaffection with the
state. As a law professor. I know that it is easy to
overestimate the capacity of myself, my colleagues, my
students and the few readers of my articles to rewrite
the constitution. And in this case, frankly. I would be
happy to learn that I made no contribution whatsoever.




I have argued that neo-liberalism, globalization,
populism, decentralization and juridification are
transforming Canada's political economy, and
reshaping its constitution. But I must confess that I
have neither asked nor answered what is arguably the
most important question of all: what does it really mean
to say that our constitution has been reshaped, that
some new constitutional assumption, value or process
has been chiselled in stone? If I had to answer that
question, to be honest, I am not sure how I would.
Remember: I am a constitutional donkey. I do not know
whether constitutions are a cause or an effect of
fundamental change. or neither of the above. I do not
know whether we think their provisions are chiselled in
normative bedrock because constitutions actually do
make the state the way it is - or whether they are just
categorical statements about how we want things to be
or believe them to be. On the contrary I sometimes
ask myself- is it possible that constitutions in the full,
extended sense of the term are in fact not so
fundamental or long lasting after all, that they are
always being re-imagined, always being rewritten? To
a donkey like me, this last is a very intriguing prospect.
Harry W. Arthurs
Professor of Law and Political Science, and
President Emeritus, York University, Toronto.
Versions of this text were originally presented as the
Mervin Leitch, Q.C. Lectures at the Universities of
Alberta and Calgary on 30 January and 1 February
2002, respectively, and at an interdisciplinary
colloquium at the University of Sydney. Australia, on
17 March 2002. 1 am most grateful for the invitations
from the three host institutions, and for comments
received by participants at these three events, especially
those of the editor of Constitutional Forum, Tsvi
Kahana.
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